POLITICS AND RELIGION IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES



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Chapter Four

Putting God into the City: Protestants in France

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In contemporary French history, Protestants have constantly been opposed to the idea of a Christian state. Part of the reason for this is rooted in their theology, but their position has been mainly due to their specific history. Their Huguenot past has always reminded them of the danger of an alliance between the Catholic majority and the state. This alliance meant for them discrimination and even persecution, while the Republic and a secular state meant religious freedom. Unlike in the United States, Protestants are a tiny Christian minority in France.[1] They represent today around 2.2 percent of the total French population (62 million). Confronted with the Catholic giant and its rich past of political and societal power, it is no wonder French Protestants have been used to thinking that the further the state is from religions, the better off it is. This idea was widely accepted around 1905. Although not unanimously, the vast majority of French Protestants welcomed the separation between state and church and the principle that guided it, defined by the French as laicity (*laïcité*).[2] The French are quite proud of this concept (wrongly translated as secularism) and like to think of it as their property (however other countries also practice it). *Laïcité* means that the state holds a neutral position in religious matters and offers no support to any religion in particular. This also means that all religions are equal before the law. Freedom of conscience and religion must be total with respect to the rights of individuals. According to specialists such as Jean Baubérot and Claude Nicolet, it attempts to reconcile "freedom of conscience" (everyone has the right to believe what he or she chooses) and "freedom of thought." What does this "free-

dom of thought" mean exactly? It means that the state, through its public schools, intends to foster emancipation by giving each citizen the opportunity to learn to think freely without being locked into the ideas of his or her native social group. The public school system must allow each individual to be confronted with different systems of thought, different cultural references so that he or she can make choices more freely.

In some ways this "freedom of thought" scares the American public because it seems to give the state too much importance. But it must be understood within a specific historical context. The emphasis on "freedom of thought" can be explained by the fact that France, unlike the United States, was submitted for a very long time to the religious and cultural monopoly of the Catholic Church, the bulwark of the monarchy. When the Republic settled into place durably, it had to fight this Catholic monopoly and educate the population to pluralism and a new democratic culture. Thus, the state chose to take on the role of an emancipator. It is not surprising then if French Protestants, like the Jews, largely agreed with this from the beginning, because it gave them complete equality with Catholic citizens.

How has this attitude evolved in the course of the last century? From 1905 to 2005, three different emphases and contexts can be distinguished: (1) The initial acceptance of an almost complete separation between churches and the state could be typified as a global refusal of the "city of God." (2) A century later, this framework is still present. However, another emphasis emerged in the late twentieth century, the refusal of a "city without God." (3) Finally, the attitude of many French Protestants today would be the will to put "God in the city."

French Protestants in 1905: A Big "No" to the City of God

Many French Protestants did not particularly applaud the 1905 law of separation between churches and state. The majority of them were "far from enthusiastic."[3] However, all of them accepted it, sometimes with gratitude, sometimes with a few concerns. The Lutherans were the most cautious.

The Lutheran Response to 1905: A Cautious Acceptance

With the Reformed church, the Lutherans benefited from the system prevailing before 1905. This system, set up in 1802, felt comfortable to many French Protestants. Throughout the nineteenth century, a controlled religious market where the state played a pivotal role characterized the French religious situation. Until 1905 the French state financed Catholicism, Lutheran and Reformed Protestantism, and Judaism to the exclusion of all other confessions. A French historian has described this situation as the "concordatary game," in

which the state regulated the "controlled pluralism" of the recognized religious confessions.[4] The term "concordatary" refers to the Concordat, a special law drawn up in 1801 between the Vatican and the French state, which gave new public privileges to the Catholic Church (priests received state salaries, for example). Later an extension of this system was applied to the Reformed and Lutheran Protestants (1802) and to the Jews (1808); according to this system, which points to a "first stage of laicization,"[5] Protestantism was officially "reintegrated" after over a century of persecution.[6] Until 1905, Protestant ministers were paid by the state (as were Jewish and Catholic priests) and their social role was broadly recognized. At the beginning of the twentieth century, this system was particularly appreciated by the Lutherans, who were considerably weaker than the Reformed Protestants since the French defeat by Germany in 1871, which led to the loss of the eastern provinces (traditional strongholds of French Lutherans). This is why, like the majority of the Jews,[7] they did not push for a law of separation. But unlike the Catholics who refused the consequences of the 1905 law, they abided by it.

The Calvinistic and Evangelical Response to 1905: Overall Support

The Calvinistic and the evangelical responses to 1905 were more enthusiastic. The Reformed churches, proud of their Huguenot past, had more theological reasons than the Lutherans for accepting a clear separation between churches and the state. The influence of Alexandre Vinet (1797-1897) was essential. This Swiss Reformed theologian led a majority of Reformed Protestants to favor a moderate separation. The biggest impact of Vinet was in the evangelical wing of the Reformed churches. At the Anduze Synod, from June 24 to July 4, 1902, this branch of the Reformed churches gave unanimous support to the separation. Vinet's thought has played an essential role. Jean Baubérot describes him as the "first francophone theologian of laicity [*laïcité*]."[8] Reflecting on the fact that the church, the body of Christ, would no longer be supported by the state, Vinet deeply influenced French Reformed Protestants and evangelical Protestants. Among the latter, a small minority did not belong either to the Reformed churches or to the Lutherans.[9] They did not benefit from the Concordat, which built a wall of separation between the "established" (concordatary religion) and the "outsiders" (often described as "non-recognized" or "dissenters").[10] In the same way as the "established" and the "outsiders" studied by Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson in the Winston Parva community, the concordatary Christians and the non-concordatary, or unrecognized religious groups, rapidly became distinct poles, affirming their distinctiveness on each side of a line of separation born of the "concordatary game."

It was among the non-concordatary and the non-recognized Protestants that several new evangelical churches had appeared during the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the century this tendency included a few Quakers,[11] Mora-

vians, and Anabaptists;[12] after the Geneva Revival (1817-20), it was strengthened along with the whole of French Protestantism by reinstating personal conversion and the inspiration of the Bible as central beliefs of what became evangelical Christianity.[13] The growth of international Protestant mission work also encouraged the development of new churches such as Methodist and Baptist churches in France during the first third of the nineteenth century.[14] For these Protestants, the Concordat provided no support. It provided inequality, and gave arguments to the Catholic Church against new "unrecognized" Protestants.[15] On the contrary, a full separation between the state and the churches restored equality of status. This is why non-concordatary evangelicals were the most enthusiastic supporters of the law of separation. Religion was no longer state funded, and the former distinction between "official religions" and "dissident religions" was no longer valid. For Reuben Saillens, the main leader of French Evangelicals at that time, 1905 was "the best date in French History."[16]

The Protestant Dream: A Neutral Republic Rather than a Clerical City of God

Although French Protestants reacted to 1905 with some diversity, a common feature can be highlighted: almost all of them favored a neutral republic rather than a clerical city of God. This was a major difference between them and a large half of French Catholics who had a difficult time accepting the very idea of a secular republic before 1914. Many Catholic leaders still had some nostalgia for an old-fashioned Catholic monarchy. The main reason why all French Protestants were strong republicans was precisely the fear of a strong Catholic comeback in French politics.[17] While Catholics, encouraged by a defiant pope, decided to refuse involvement in the first republican governments, Protestants rushed to secure ministerial positions. There had been five Protestant ministers out of nine in the first republican government following the departure of Mac Mahon in 1879. Along with the Jews, they were resolute in fighting for the Republic against the ghost of an old-fashioned city of God where the crown and the Catholic Church dictated from above what is right or what is wrong, what is good religion and what is heresy.[18] While the Holy See and the French government broke diplomatic relations on July 30, 1904, the Protestant elite, on the contrary, developed closer links with the political power of the time. No wonder then if one of the major authors of the French law of separation was precisely a Protestant, Louis Méjean, son and brother of Protestant ministers. Méjean believed that a wise separation would lead to a "spiritual reform,"[19] and that Protestants had nothing to fear in the process. Showing their republican spirit, French Protestants also handed over all their confessional schools to the state after the 1905 law, believing that the Republic's education system could continue the educative and moral mission they had promoted.[20]

This common republican emphasis did not mean for the Protestants that the state should ignore the social or moral role of the churches. The French historian

Patrick Cabanel, who highlights the Protestant roots of a liberal separation that is not supposed to annihilate religion's social role, has particularly emphasized this point. This is why they expressed deep concerns when Emile Combes submitted a first draft of the bill of separation that was perceived as anti-Christian.[21] The solution favored by the French Protestants might have been closer to a kind of American civil religion than to a "laicity without God."[22] To them, the Republic's neutrality was a good thing (even a blessing) as long as it did not become hostility towards religion.

A Century Later: A Growing "No" to a City without God

A century later, the love story between French Protestants and a secular republic is still not over. The commemoration of the centennial anniversary of the 1905 law revealed a wide national consensus, including the Catholic Church and its bishops. However, the global context has changed dramatically in the meantime. In 2005, the threat of a clerical "city of God" has been dead for decades. The war of the two Frances[23]—opposing a conservative, Catholic France and a progressive, republican France—is long forgotten. What French Protestants fear now is no longer a city of God, but a city without God. Three factors explain this new trend.

Christianity as a Foreign Culture

The first factor is the growing absence of Christianity in the French cultural mainstream. After its inception during the French Revolution, the process of dissociating politics and religion reached its climax in 1905, but since then, it seems that a new process has taken place: the gradual eviction of Christianity from French culture as a whole, highlighted by Danièle Hervieu-Léger.[24] Regularly practicing Christians make up only around 10 percent of the population (a little more than four times lower than in the United States), and the younger generation is even less involved in religious practice.[25] The dominant culture of the individual has resulted in the cultural relativization of all religious norms and the triumph of secular leisure over religious observance. In stressing the value of personal appropriation of meaning, it dilutes the notion of any "revealed" truth. Catholic France or Christian France is now defunct, replaced by the new "Pagan France" described by a French bishop, Hippolyte Simon.[26] Ordinary citizens display a growing ignorance of Christian values or culture, leading even Régis Debray, an icon of the French leftist intelligentsia, to plead for a course on religion in state schools.[27] Between 1905 and 2005, Christianity has almost disappeared from the cultural mainstream. To Protestants as to other Christians, the French city appears now as a "city without God."

Christianity under Attack

This perception is strengthened by another fact: Christianity has not only become a foreign culture, it is also more and more visibly under attack.[28] Contrary to the American situation, where Christianity, and particularly evangelical Protestantism, seems sometimes to work like a quasi-de facto religious establishment, religion in general is often disqualified as antimodern. Terrorism from Muslim states like Egypt is regularly linked uniquely to Islam (neglecting the problems of corruption and poverty which also explain terrorism to a large extent). In the same way, Catholicism is often attacked in the public sphere as an old-fashioned and dangerous antimodern superstition.[29] While benefiting from a good "modern" reputation in the media, Protestants are not entirely safe from attack. The Iraq war in 2003 revealed a flourish of articles and publications denouncing the "Bush sect." A widely distributed weekly, *Marianne*, translated George W. Bush's policy in purely religious terms: "Bush's sect attacks."[30] Another left-wing weekly, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, devoted its main report to U.S. evangelicals, "the sect [cult] that wants to conquer the world."[31] Slimane Zeghidour portrays them as "crusaders of the Apocalypse." In the weekly *La Vie*, Jean Mercier described the White House as "taken hostage by a fundamentalist sect."[32] Although one cannot deny that the "theo-conservatives" played a role around President Bush, the French media had a clear tendency to overemphasize the religious factor. While Christianity was also attacked by some secular republicans in 1905, the majority of the population (including many moderate republicans and large sections of the mainstream press) defended it, sometimes very strongly. This is no longer the case and along with Catholics, French Protestants have had to adapt to this new context.

Christianity Challenged and Deregulated

A century after 1905, a third new parameter is the deregulation of the religious marketplace. The 1905 religious landscape was quite simple. On one side, there was republican ideology, supported by the two main religious minorities (Jews and Protestants), on the other side, conservative ideology, supported by a majority of Catholics. Today, while republican ideas have prevailed everywhere, the religious landscape has both weakened and diversified. There are far more than three religious players in contemporary France. Islam has now become the second religion in France while Buddhism is growing steadily and benefits from an extremely positive image in the media. Books devoted to esotericism, Eastern spiritualities, and new religious movements flourish on the shelves of the main Parisian bookshops. The "chain of memory" that is at the heart of inherited religion is challenged by new conversion discourses.[33] Since the 1980s, the mainstream media has discovered that "sects" seem to be developing everywhere, while all organized religions have been undergoing not only decline, but also internal reshaping. Vertical authority and institutional discipline are more and

more challenged (even in Catholicism), while personal charisma, conversion and voluntary associations are promoted,[34] creating many new movements. In Protestant circles, this tendency nurtured the growth of the evangelical movement. Still weak in 1945, with about fifty thousand believers, the evangelical constituency has vastly multiplied in size, so that there are today two hundred thousand Pentecostals, forty thousand Baptists, not to mention charismatics,[35] members of Brethren Assemblies, independent evangelicals, Mennonites, Methodists, and many others. In 2005, evangelical Protestants amounted to almost four hundred thousand believers if we include all ethnic churches,[36] and they have generated an important internal recomposition of Protestantism.[37] This process of fragmentation, restructuring, and deregulation has created identity problems. On the one hand, republican ideology is less vocal now, opening the way to other discourses. On the other hand, more and more distinct communities express their need to exist as specific identities. Marcel Gauchet has typified this trend as a "Republic of identities" (*République des identités*),[38] while political scientist Philippe Portier emphasizes the republican will to articulate "differences with democracy."[39] In this new context, identities, including the Protestant identity, have to compete if they want to exist in the public space.

French Protestants and Politics Today: God in the City

In the political arena, French Protestants today have no intention of restoring a so-called "city of God." But they do not want either a "city without God." What they are fighting for in 2005 is different. As Christians, they are unwilling to be reduced to the private sphere. They intend to witness "God in the city" in a pluralistic context in which their distinct identity needs to be heard. This has been very clearly stated by several Protestant leaders, including Jean-Arnold de Clermont, president of the French Protestant Federation. In April 2004, he wrote: "French Protestantism and laicity [*laïcité*] have long been like a 'fish in water,' but today, the fish lacks oxygen." Explaining what he meant by that, he denounced the "privatization of religion" in the name of laicity, insisting that the public sphere needs religious voices.[40]

Protestants More Vocal in Politics?

The first sign of this new Protestant boldness might be seen in a slightly more direct involvement in politics. Protestants have always been engaged in republican politics. In the 1980s and the 1990s, Protestants held several major ministerial posts, including the post of prime minister (Michel Rocard, from 1988 to 1991, and Lionel Jospin, from 1997 to 2002). However, this political involvement was not dictated by denominational interest. Jospin and Rocard did not influence French politics as representatives of Protestant options, but as So-

cialist leaders. One could argue that fifteen years before, a very famous political statement from the Protestant Federation, the document *Eglise et pouvoir* (1971), had a big impact. Heavily influenced by the Marxist mood of the moment, *Eglise et pouvoir* described capitalist society as "unacceptable." However, if this document had indeed some political impact, it was not presented as a political proposition, but in a prophetic mode. It was less a Protestant contribution than a universal and transconfessional statement. Following this document, which created an intense debate in Protestant ranks,[41] the political involvement of Protestants has remained cautious and careful. This kind of discreet involvement in the political elite is still visible today. The traditional affinity of a majority of Protestants with left-wing parties, which can be explained by the historic link between left-wing parties and republican ideology, still works as well. A survey conducted between 2003 and 2004 reveals that 42.5 percent of French Protestants included in the panel said they preferred the Left, while only 30 percent said they preferred right-wing parties.[42]

But along with these continuities, one cannot help but see that French Protestants have recently engaged in new paths. First, the strong evangelical minority that emerged after 1945 seems to have disturbed the traditional discretion of the Protestant voice in the public arena. The main example of this is the Comité Protestant Evangélique pour la Dignité Humaine (CPDH [Evangelical Protestant Committee for Human Dignity]),[43] a new network created in 1999. Linking various evangelical networks, the intent of the CPDH is to promote a Bible-based ethic and fundamental Judeo-Christian values, and to take a stand in the media and vis-à-vis the administration on key social issues.[44] Although far less influential than its U.S. evangelical counterparts, the CPDH works on a similar basis: active lobbying in the public place. Another sign of change is the increasing will of the French Protestant Federation and many Protestant representatives to have regular access to the government, copying in this way the Catholics and the Jews. The new "Reformation dinners," bringing together the Protestant elite and actors from the political arena is an example of this trend. The first one was organized October 14, 2004, at the French Senate, and invited as a guest speaker Régis Debray, former adviser to French President François Mitterrand.[45] During his meeting with Jean-Pierre Raffarin, the French prime minister, one of the main requests expressed by Jean-Arnold de Clermont, president of the French Protestant Federation, was an annual meeting with the government.[46] It seems that the Reformation dinner may have provided a springboard for this: several major political figures, including Finance Minister Thierry Breton (the main speaker) were present at the second Reformation dinner, held on October 13, 2005. Although French elites likes to present themselves as egalitarian and against *communautarisme* (ethnic or religious factionalism), the reality of today's France is characterized by the growing role of religious communities per se, each one competing for access to the republican state. Once again, the French situation is still far from the American scene, but some converging trends are obvious.

A Vital New Front: The Media

Gaining access to state elites is only part of the new Protestant attitude towards politics. Even if the media are not supposed to play a role in politics, they obviously get involved in the game as a "fourth power." Therefore, French Protestants know that if they want fair treatment, even in local situations, they need to be known by the media. In a context of severe decline of religious culture in the younger generation, Protestants could easily be put on a par with cults, compromising the religious life of several communities, particularly in evangelical circles and ethnic churches. They also face another risk: their "modern" image of an individualistic Christianity open to reform and debate could tend to dissolve their specific religious identity. In this context of "Protestant precariousness" in contemporary France,[47] the Protestant Federation and the Reformed and Lutheran churches have developed new media strategies in the last twenty years, particularly through the Internet,[48] but also through French television (through religious services broadcast on Sunday mornings). But the most active Protestants in this area have probably been French evangelical churches. As newcomers, characterized by a strong emphasis on conversion and religious advertising, they suffer from an image deficit. But they use many strategies to counter this deficit. In addition to a huge investment in the internet,[49] they have developed many media-friendly events (like their invitation to Billy Graham in 1986) emphasizing contact with political representatives where possible. For example, Billy Graham had a personal interview with President François Mitterrand in 1986, and generated comparisons with Pope John Paul II, who visited France the same year.[50] Eighteen years later, Nicolas Sarkozy, interior minister in the Raffarin government, was invited to the general assembly of the French Evangelical Federation.[51]

The Fight for Institutional Weight

Last but not least, French Protestants tend today to invest in their most neglected field: their own institutions. Traditionally, Protestants do not really like institutions, and they certainly do not sanctify them. Opposed to the church model defended by Catholic Rome, they favor voluntary societies in which central institutions play a minimal role. This remains globally true in the contemporary French Protestant scene. However, the refusal of a rigid institutional "church" structure does not imply that religious socialization is narrowly situated in this or that association or autonomous community, as Nancy Ammerman, among others, has suggested.[52] The number and effectiveness of supralocal French Protestant networks is proof enough. Among them, two have been gaining significant institutional weight.

The bigger and the most important one by far is the French Protestant Federation (FPF). Created in 1905 to defend Protestant interests in French society, the FPF has gradually developed into a representative body of almost all French

Protestant families including evangelicals. Pastor Jean-Arnold de Clermont, current president of the FPF, is obviously convinced of this representative role in the political arena. During the 2001 debate on the so-called anti-cult legislation passed by the French Parliament, he repeatedly gained the attention of the main media through his criticisms and comments. In the name of the FPF, he also expressed several concerns about the 1905 law and the need to adapt it to the new context. When an African evangelical community in Paris seemed to be discriminated against early in 2004, de Clermont and the FPF played a prominent role in the public debate about religious freedom. In a confrontation with Jean-Pierre Brard, a Communist mayor suspected of discrimination, the FPF took him to court.[53] The impact of the FPF's actions such as these is heightened to the extent that the federation's weight is seen to be significant. In that respect, the pursuit of the enlargement of the FPF can be seen, not only as a purely ecumenical affair between Protestants, but also as an effective way to gain more influence in the public arena.[54]

Among French evangelical Protestants, the need for a more significant institutional weight can also be noticed, albeit to a lesser extent. The French section of the Evangelical Alliance (AEF) plays a coordinating role. It was relaunched in 1953 under the leadership of Pastor Jean-Paul Benoît. The creation of the Fédération Evangélique de France (French Evangelical Federation [FEF]) on March 22, 1969, also participated in the networking dynamic.[55] Its starting position was clearly fundamentalist, countercultural, and eager to build a rampart against "bad" influences. However the federative logic (necessarily integrating a certain amount of internal diversity) brought more flexibility to its official discourse. By evolving gradually toward more dialogue and more multilateral orientation, the FEF has strengthened its ties with the French Evangelical Alliance. Today these two main evangelical networks have defined a common "platform." This has led to the creation on January 7, 2002, of the Conseil National des Evangéliques en France (National Council of French Evangelicals [a temporary name]). It is too early to evaluate the public impact of this new structure, but what is already clear is that in spite of their decentralized culture, French Protestants have learned that in the more and more pluralistic and secular arena in which they live, they need to regroup their forces if they want to be heard by politicians and the media.

Conclusion

If the hard statistical data seems to suggest that "God is dead" in contemporary Europe,[56] the French case leads us to realize that after all, religions and politicians alike still need to find a place for "God in the city." The example of French Protestant activism today, fuelled by a less rigid republican attitude towards identities and by the growth of evangelical churches, seems to show that a moderate interaction between a monotheistic God and the Republic is not purely

an American thing. Along with Catholics and Jews (and to a certain extent Muslims), French Protestants want to choose neither an aggressive Pat Robertson way, nor a purely secular society reducing God to a private matter. Unabashed by hard-line secularist opponents, they believe that a respectful Christian involvement in the public place can strengthen the Republic instead of defeating it, and bring social and political benefits for society as a whole.

Might their influence contribute to a movement going beyond the founding myths of French *laïcité*,[57] towards a kind of new French civil religion? Historically, American civil religion was created in order to deal with a very broad and diverse religious landscape more or less infused by a democratic spirit.[58] A generic God and shared beliefs had a vital function to unite the U.S. melting pot and create an "imagined community."[59] On the contrary, the different way chosen by French laicity (*laïcité*) can be explained by a situation of a relatively undiversified religious landscape, where the Catholic majority faced the republicans. These conditions have changed dramatically today. In spite of the impact of secularization, France's religious landscape is far more diversified, including a wide range of Protestant churches, denominations, and sects, while the war of the two Frances is over. Even if many people in France might have a hard time admitting it, these changes could create a social and religious situation closer to what Americans experienced through their civil religion.

Notes

1. The French Protestant Federation (FPF) estimated the total number of Protestants to be around 1.1 million in 2005: nine hundred thousand in the FPF and two hundred thousand outside. A survey conducted by the IFOP polling company for the Protestant weekly *Réforme* in 2003-4 was more generous, with an estimate of 1.3 million. See "Éléments d'analyse sur la sociologie et le positionnement politique des protestants en France," *Réforme*, January 2005.

2. There is no accepted convention for transcribing this term in English. One can find "laïcity," "laicism," or "laicite." By far the worst option is "secularism." "Laicity" is *not* a synonym of secularization. It is a *specific way* to organize a secular and pluralistic society.

3. André Encrevé, *Les protestants en France de 1800 à nos jours, histoire d'une réintegration* (Paris: Stock, 1985), 227.

4. Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet, *Le jeu concordataire dans la France du XIXe siècle* (Paris: PUF, 1988).

5. Jean Baubérot, *La laïcité, quel héritage? De 1789 à nos jours* (Geneva: Labor & Fides, 1990).

6. Encrevé, *Les protestants*.

7. Sébastien Fath, "Juifs et protestants face à la loi de 1905 sur la séparation des Églises et de l'Etat," *Les Cahiers du Judaïsme* 9 (Winter-Spring 2001): 104-20.

8. Jean Baubérot, "Les évangéliques et la séparation française des Églises et de l'Etat," in *Le protestantisme évangélique. Un christianisme de conversion*, ed. Sebastien Fath (Turnhout, Belgium: Brépols, 2004), 236.

9. In the U.S., many Reformed churches would be regarded as "evangelical." In

France, however, even if there is an evangelical tendency within the Reformed Church. Reformed Protestants are usually not considered as full evangelicals, because their local communities do not select their members solely on the basis of individual conversion.

10. See Sébastien Fath, *Une autre manière d'être chrétien en France. Socio-histoire de l'implantation baptiste, 1810-1950* (Geneva: Labor & Fides, 2001), 1043-61.

11. Henri Van Etten, *Chronique de la vie quaker française, 1745-1945* (Paris: Société Religieuse des Amis, 1947).

12. Jean Séguy, *Les assemblées anabaptistes de France* (The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton, 1977).

13. Alice Wemyss, *Histoire du Réveil, 1790-1849* (Paris: Les Bergers et les Mages, 1977).

14. Fath, *Une autre manière*.

15. Michèle Sacquin, *Entre Bossuet et Maurras. L'antiprotestantisme en France de 1814 à 1870* (PhD diss., University of Caen, 1997).

16. Reuben Saillens quoted in Fath, *Une autre manière*, 911.

17. Patrick Cabanel, *Les protestants et la République de 1870 à nos jours* (Paris: Complexe, 2000).

18. Patrick Cabanel, *Juifs et protestants en France. Les affinités electives, XVI-XXIe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 2004).

19. L.V.Méjean, *La Séparation des Églises et de l'Etat, L'oeuvre de Louis Méjean, dernier directeur de l'administration autonome des cultes* (Paris: PUF, 1959), 207.

20. In 1905, there were 1,608 French Protestant schools that were working according to the Falloux law. Protestants gave up this confessional network in the name of French laicity (*laïcité*). See Cabanel, *Les protestants*, 63.

21. This draft forbade national religious organizations. This measure was a threat for Catholics, but even more for small religious minorities like the Protestants. "The innocent [Protestants] get worse treatment than the culprits" (*Les innocents plus maltraités que les coupables*), Louis Pédézert, *Le Christianisme au XXe siècle*, December 1, 1904, quoted in Jean Baubérot, *Le retour des Huguenots. La vitalité protestante, XIX-XXe siècle* (Paris and Geneva: Cerf-Labor et Fides, 1985), 89.

22. Patrick Cabanel, *Le Dieu de la République. Aux sources protestantes de la laïcité, 1860-1900* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2003).

23. Emile Poulat, *Liberté, laïcité. La guerre des deux France et le principe de la modernité* (Paris: Cerf-Cujas, 1987).

24. Danièle Hervieu-Léger, *Catholicisme. La fin d'un monde* (Paris: Bayard, 2003).

25. Among the fifteen- to twenty-four-year age group, only 7.6 percent of women and 9.2 percent of men practice a religion, according to the INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques). See *Enquête Permanente sur les Conditions de Vie des ménages* (Paris: Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, 2004).

26. Hippolyte Simon, *Vers une France païenne?* (Paris: Cana, 1999).

27. See Régis Debray, *L'enseignement du fait religieux dans l'École laïque* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2002).

28. René Rémond, *Le christianisme en accusation* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 2000).

29. See the huge success of Michel Onfray's books; this atheist philosopher would have a very narrow audience in the United States. In France, he is widely published and read. Raised in a Catholic school, Onfray pleads for the complete eviction of religion and its replacement by an atheistic ethic. In Michel Onfray, *Traité d'athéologie* (Paris: Grasset, 2005), the author compares Pope Pius XII to Adolf Hitler.

30. "La secte Bush attaque," *Marianne*, March 24, 2003.

31. "Les évangéliques, la secte qui veut conquérir le monde," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, February 26, 2004.

32. Jean Mercier, "Sur les terres du Président," *La Vie*, March 13, 2003, 44.

33. Danièle Hervieu-Léger, *Religion as a Chain of Memory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).

34. Danièle Hervieu-Léger, *Le pèlerin et le converti. La religion en mouvement* (Paris: Flammarion, 1999).

35. Evert Veldhuizen, *Le renouveau charismatique protestant en France, 1968-88* (PhD diss., University of Paris IV Sorbonne, 1995).

36. Sebastien Fath, *Du ghetto au réseau. Les protestants évangéliques en France, 1800-2005* (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 2005); and Sebastien Fath, "Evangelical Protestantism in France: An Example of Denominational Recomposition?" *Sociology of Religion* 66, no. 4 (2005): 399-418.

37. Jean-Paul Willaime, "Les recompositions internes au monde protestant: protestantisme 'établi' et protestantisme 'évangélique,'" in *La globalisation du religieux*, ed. Jean-Pierre Bastian, Françoise Champion, and Kathy Rouselet (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001).

38. Marcel Gauchet, *La religion dans la démocratie. Parcours de la laïcité* (Paris: Gallimard, 1998).

39. Philippe Portier, "De la séparation à la reconnaissance. L'évolution du régime français de laïcité," in *Les mutations contemporaines du religieux*, ed. Jean-Pierre Willaime and J.R. Armogathe (Turnhout, Belgium: Brépols, 2003), 7.

40. Jean-Arnold de Clermont, "Le protestantisme français a longtemps été comme 'un poisson dans l'eau' en ce qui concerne la laïcité, mais il vient à manquer d'oxygène," http://www.protestants.org (accessed April 30, 2004); Jean-Arnold de Clermont "Protestantisme et laïcité," http://www.protestants.org (accessed April 30, 2004).

41. It has also been analyzed form a sociological point of view by Jean Baubérot, *Le pouvoir de contester: contestations politico-religieuses autour de Mai 68 et le document Eglise et pouvoirs* (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1983).

42. Data taken from IFOP poll, "Éléments d'analyse sur la sociologie et le positionnement politique des protestants en France," *Réforme*, January 2005. French evangelicals, however, seem far more balanced. They even tend to favor the Right, according to Solange Wydmusch, *Les attitudes religieuses et politiques des protestants français* (PhD diss., EPHE Sorbonne University, 1995). This evangelical influence weakens the traditional left-wing leaning of the majority of French Protestants.

43. The French for "Evangelical Protestant Committee for Human Dignity" is *Comité Protestant Evangélique pour la Dignité Humaine* (CPDH).

44. The CPDH statement in French reads: "rappeler et de promouvoir une éthique basée sur la Bible et les valeurs judéo-chrétiennes fondamentales, de prendre position auprès des médias et des pouvoirs publics sur les grands thèmes de société," *Annuaire évangélique (FEF) 2005* (Dozulé: Barnabas, 2004), 501.

45. Excerpts from Regis Debray's lecture were published in *Réforme* (the main French Protestant weekly), "Les protestants selon Régis Debray," *Réforme*, October 21, 2004, 2.

46. This meeting, widely reported in the secular press, occurred on January 11, 2005. In the weekly *L'Express*, Christian Makarian wrote: "Against a new excess of Republican zeal, Protestants ask for a revision of the 1905 law" (Contre un nouvel excès de zèle républicain, les protestants demandent la révision de la loi de 1905), *L'Express*, January 17, 2005.

47. Jean-Paul Willaime, *La précarité protestante. Sociologie du protestantisme contemporain* (Paris-Genève: Labor & Fides, 1992).

48. See http://www.protestants.org, the main portal of French Protestants.

49. See http://www.topchretien.com, the main portal of francophone evangelical Protestants.

50. Jean Baubérot, Françoise Champion, and Agnès Rochefort-Turquin, "Deux leaders religieux: Billy Graham et Jean-Paul II," in *Voyage de Jean-Paul II en France*, ed. Jean Séguy, et al. (Paris: Cerf, 1988), 161-83.

51. "Sarkozy en visite chez les évangélistes," *Le Parisien*, February 2, 2004.

52. Nancy T. Ammerman, *Congregation and Community* (New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1997).

53. See Bernadette Sauvaget, "L'affaire de Montreuil en procès," *Réforme*, March 10, 2005.

54. Important negotiations have started with the Assemblies of God (ADD), the main French Pentecostal denomination. If the ADD joined the FPF, around seventy thousand new French Protestants would be represented in this network.

55. The FEF was originally called L'union des Eglises et Assemblées Evangéliques Françaises. It took its new title in November 1969, *Notre position face à certains problèmes actuels* (Paris: French Evangelical Federation, n.d.).

56. Steve Bruce, *God is Dead: Secularization in the West* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).

57. Blandine Chélini-Pont and Jeremy Gunn, *Dieu en France et aux États-Unis: quand les mythes font la loi* (Paris: Berg International, 2005).

58. Robert Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," *Daedalus* 96, no. 1 (1967): 1-18.

59. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).